Although death by neurologic criteria is legally recognized throughout the United States, state laws and clinical practice vary concerning three key issues: the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria, management of family objections before determination of death by neurologic criteria, and management of religious objections to declaration of death by neurologic criteria. The American Academy of Neurology and other medical stakeholder organizations involved in the determination of death by neurologic criteria have undertaken concerted action to address variation (...) in clinical practice in order to ensure the integrity of brain death determination. To complement this effort, state policymakers must revise legislation on the use of neurologic criteria to declare death. We review the legal history and current laws regarding neurologic criteria to declare death and offer proposed revisions to the Uniform Determination of Death Act and the rationale for these recommendations. (shrink)

This volume analyses contemporary capitalism and its crises based on a theory of capitalist evolution known as the social structure of accumulation theory. It applies this theory to explain the severe financial and economic crisis that broke out in 2008 and the kind of changes required to resolve it. The editors and contributors make available new work within this school of thought on such issues as the rise and persistence of the 'neoliberal' or 'free-market' form of capitalism since 1980 and (...) the growing globalization and financialization of the world economy. The collection includes analyses of the US economy as well as that of several parts of the developing world. (shrink)

Benenson et al. amass impressive evidence of robust sex differences as support for expanding “staying alive” theory. We argue for a broader and more domain-specific conceptualization focusing on life history tradeoffs between survival and mating success. Using three examples – women's disgust, fear of rape, and cultivation of bodyguards – we illustrate these tradeoffs and suggest a broader theoretical framework.

Right now, you are undergoing the conscious experience of reading this text, combined with a shifting background of sensory, emotional, and cognitive coloring. The conscious experience of the reading, together with the accompanying background feel of sensation, emotion, and thought, make up how things subjectively seem to you, how things appear, as best you can tell, from your own unique point of view. Consciousness is at once acutely familiar-it makes up the experienced moments of your waking (and perhaps your dreaming) (...) life. But consciousness also raises deep and interesting philosophical questions, questions about how any mere physical subject could produce such a wonder, and questions about how there could be a seemingly private and isolated spot of personal subjectivity in an objective, impersonal world. Perhaps the challenge of developing a satisfying theoretical understanding of consciousness is beyond us-we've reached the limits of what we can comprehend. Or maybe today's shortcomings are only temporary barriers to an illuminating theory of consciousness, one properly embedding it in our scientific worldview. And possibly we already have the resources for a satisfactory theory from the way we think about things in commonsense terms. This reader provides an entry point for considering these and related theoretical questions surrounding consciousness. This introductory section begins with a brief background survey of contemporary debates on consciousness. It then provides a characterization of the notion of consciousness at issue, and considers why consciousness understood this way might be theoretically problematic. It follows with a survey of some of the major theoretical positions on consciousness, and it closes with a synopsis of the sections of the book. (shrink)

One. Hundred. Years. of. Homosexuality. I. In 1992, when the patriots among us will be celebrating the fivehundredth anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus, our cultural historians may wish to mark the centenary of  ...

red and round. According to common sense, the red, round thing we see is the tomato itself. When we have a hallucinatory vision of a tomato, however, there may be present to us no red and round phys- ical object. Still, we use the words 'red' and 'round' to describe that situation as well, this time applying them to the visual experience itself. We say that we have a red, round visual image, or a visual experience of a red disk, (...) or some such. Because we see physical objects far more often than we hallucinate, we apply terms for color and shape to physical objects far more often than to visual experiences. Moreover, different theories of perception explain in different ways the applications such terms have to physical objects and to visual experiences. But whatever their frequency and explanation, it seems clear that both sorts of application occur. (shrink)

Recent work examining and expanding traditional accounts of a virtue has been used as the foundation for a virtue-based approach to epistemology. A similar approach to aesthetics yields some striking features, which coincide with contemporary philosophical concerns about the nature and definition of art. Those writing on virtue-based epistemology have offered epistemic theories based on intellectual virtues, defining knowledge from the nature of such virtues. This basic program can be applied to aesthetics so that art is defined using a virtue (...) theory of aesthetics. I will propose and examine the nature and structure of one such theory. I argue here that an approach to aesthetics, which defines art according to aesthetic virtues, would have characteristics that fit well with the value and interests we have about art. (shrink)

The paper considers contemporary models of presumption in terms of their ability to contribute to a working theory of presumption for argumentation. Beginning with the Whatelian model, we consider its contemporary developments and alternatives, as proposed by Sidgwick, Kauffeld, Cronkhite, Rescher, Walton, Freeman, Ullmann-Margalit, and Hansen. Based on these accounts, we present a picture of presumptions characterized by their nature, function, foundation and force. On our account, presumption is a modal status that is attached to a claim and has the (...) effect of shifting, in a dialogue, a burden of proof set at a local level. Presumptions can be analysed and evaluated inferentially as components of rule-based structures. Presumptions are defeasible, and the force of a presumption is a function of its normative foundation. This picture seeks to provide a framework to guide the development of specific theories of presumption. (shrink)

Abstract While agreeing that dynamical models play a major role in cognitive science, we reject Stepp, Chemero, and Turvey's contention that they constitute an alternative to mechanistic explanations. We review several problems dynamical models face as putative explanations when they are not grounded in mechanisms. Further, we argue that the opposition of dynamical models and mechanisms is a false one and that those dynamical models that characterize the operations of mechanisms overcome these problems. By briefly considering examples involving the generation (...) of action potentials and circadian rhythms, we show how decomposing a mechanism and modeling its dynamics are complementary endeavors. (shrink)

In this article I take up a central question posed by the article jointly authored with Bill Winslade in this issue of JCE: What should be the role of clinical ethics consultants (CECs) in (what we call) an unsettled case: that is, a situation in which the range of allowable choices, among which the parties to a bioethical disagreement must select, cannot be clearly or completely specified? I argue here that CECs should, in such cases, guide the parties by presenting (...) their own reasoned conclusions about what the scope of allowable choices should be taken to include. Since this position challenges the received view that CECs must not express their own moral positions or conclusions in their role as ethicists, I try to defend my view of the CEC’s role in unsettled cases against several objections. (shrink)

A philosophy might take its general inspiration from (1) commonsense; (2) careful observation; (3) philosophical argumentation; (4) the sciences; (5) "higher" sources of illumination. It is argued in this paper that it is bedrock commonsense, and the sciences, which are the most reliable foundations for a philosophy. This result is applied to the discussion and defense of a materialist theory of the mind.

In this Current Controversy article, I describe and analyse the imminent move to a system of deemed consent for deceased organ donation in England and similar planned changes in Scotland, in light of evidence from Wales, where the system changed in 2015. Although the media has tended to focus on the potential benefits and ethical issues relating to the main change from an opt-in default to an opt-out one, other defaults will also change, while some will remain the same. Interaction (...) of these other defaults with the principal one raise several ethical issues that may complicate efforts to use deemed consent to increase donation rates. Most significantly, changing the main default will have the effect of changing the default for patients' families, who play a vital role in the consent process. (shrink)

The first book-length treatment of Paul Ricoeur's conception of philosophy as critical theory.

Uchiyama et al. rightly consider how cultural variation may influence estimates of heritability by contributing to environmental sources of variation. We disagree, however, with the idea that generalisable estimates of heritability are ever a plausible aim. Heritability estimates are always context-specific, and to suggest otherwise is to misunderstand what heritability can and cannot tell us.

In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.

Leveraging, according to David M. Anderson and his colleagues, is both a basic principle of human conduct and the most dominant strategy in recent years that individuals, organizations and countries use to pursue their ends. Although many scholars agree that a crisis of "over-leveraging" caused the financial crisis of 2008-2010, it has not been appreciated that an "over-leveraging" crisis has existed in American politics and the American family system as well. This book addresses the need for a "Leverage Mean" (...) (falling between the extremes of too much leverage and too little leverage) in the economy, politics, family life, and international relations. It identifies three different kinds of leveraging-bargaining, resource, and investment and provides an explanatory and normative theory which draws on the fields of economics, political science, sociology, history, psychology, international relations, law, and philosophy. Moreover, it shows how the dissolution of the Cold War, the dismantling of the modern family, and the rise of the Internet along with the deregulation of the financial services industry led to the diffusion of power which has made leveraging of the first importance for everyone. This book should be of interest to social scientists, philosophers, political theorists, public policy makers and politicians. David Anderson and his colleagues are the first to characterize and assess one of the major instruments of power of the contemporary era. This volume represents the best work on leverage since Archimedes and will be widely read and discussed. Benjamin Ginsberg, David Bernstein Professor of Political Science and Chair, Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, Johns Hopkins University Leverage might literally be the operative word of the 21st century. Anderson's volume is a wide-ranging and illuminating study of this fundamental and dynamic concept. Parag Khanna, Senior Fellow, New Amer ica Foundation, author of The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global Competition in the Twenty-first Century. (shrink)

We give an axiomatic framework for the non-modular simple 0-categorical structures constructed by Hrushovski. This allows us to verify some of their properties in a uniform way, and to show that these properties are preserved by iterations of the construction.

This chapter contains sections titled: Religious Questions and Metaphysical Questions God of the Philosophers The Kind of Belief that Matters Philosophical Foundations What Metaphysical Reasoning Can Do Belief and Experience Notes.

This chapter examines the mystical and erotic in Hillman’s early thought through the influence of the ancient Greek god Dionysus. With a focus on the embodied, emotional, and erotic nature of Dionysus, I will show how these qualities came to formulate the core theoretical vision of Hillman’s archetypal hermeneutic and served as a critique of traditional psychological epistemologies, as well as of normative scholarly approaches in both the humanities and sciences. In “saving” image, symbol, and even the “mystical,” from an (...) analytic, disembodied, and misogynist reductionism, Hillman’s archetypal psychology champions a form of transformational subjectivity, and personally redemptive mysticism, through an ontological affirmation of what Jung understood as the reality of the psyche. (shrink)

In the context of deceased organ donation, donors are routinely tested for HIV, to check for suitability for organ donation. This article examines whether a donor’s HIV status should be disclosed to the donor’s next of kin.On the one hand, confidentiality requires that sensitive information not be disclosed, and a duty to respect confidentiality may persist after death. On the other hand, breaching confidentiality may benefit third parties at risk of having been infected by the organ donor, as it may (...) permit them to be tested for HIV and seek treatment in case of positive results.We conclude that the duty to warn third parties surpasses the duty to respect confidentiality. However, in order to minimize risks linked to the breach of confidentiality, information should be restrained to only concerned third parties, that is, those susceptible to having been infected by the donor. (shrink)

This critical note responds to Guiaşu and Tindale’s “Logical fallacies and invasion biology,” from our perspective as ecologists and philosophers of science engaged in debates about invasion biology and invasive species. We agree that “the level of charges and dismissals” surrounding these debates might be “unhealthy” and that “it will be very difficult for dialogues to move forward unless genuine attempts are made to understand the positions being held and to clarify the terms involved.” Although they raise several important scientific, (...) conceptual, and ethical issues at the foundations of invasion biology, we believe Guiaşu and Tindale’s attempts to clarify the debate were unsuccessful. Like some other critics of the field, they tend to misrepresent invasion biology by cherry-picking and constructing “straw people,” inaccurately portraying invasion biology, and thus failing to elevate the dialogue. In this critique, we clarify areas in the invasion biology literature misrepresented by Guiaşu and Tindale. We attempt to provide a more balanced view of areas of reasonable debate within invasion biology, including disputes about empirical evidence, diverse risk attitudes, and other diverse ethical commitments. (shrink)

David M. Zientek; Response to the Consensus Statement of the Working Group on Roman Catholic Approaches to Determining Appropriate Critical Care, Christian bioe.

In the past two to three decades health behavior scientists have increasingly emphasized affect-related concepts (including, but not limited to emotion) in their attempts to understand and facilitate change in important health behaviors, such as smoking, eating, physical activity, substance abuse, and sex. This article provides a narrative review of this burgeoning literature, including relevant theory and research on affective response (e.g., hedonic response to eating and drug use), incidental affect (e.g., work-related stress as a determinant of alcohol use), affect (...) processing (e.g., anticipated regret for illicit sex or skipping an exercise session), and affectively charged motivation (e.g., cigarette craving). An integrative dual-processing framework is presented that suggests pathways through which affect-related concepts may interrelate to influence health behavior. (shrink)

In two passages from Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates refutes Aristippus, first by a rather brutal brand of Realpolitik, then by refusing to answer Aristippus’ questions about the good and the beautiful. This article argues that the nasty politics that emerge in Memorabilia 2.1 are not Socratic, but rather the natural consequence of Aristippean hedonism. Political considerations of another sort drive Socrates’ tactics in Memorabilia 3.8, where his evasive manoeuvres are driven by his desire to avoid a direct confrontation with hedonism. ocrates’ (...) own views are hedonistic in some sense, as revealed by his otherwise irrelevant discussion of pleasing home plans and altar sites at the end of 3.8, but Socrates does not wish to reveal as much to companions lacking his self-control. Socrates’ treatment of Aristippus has as much to do with politics as with pleasure. (shrink)

Richard Feldman has argued that in cases of religious disagreement between epistemic peers who have shared all relevant evidence, epistemic rationality requires suspense of judgment. I argue that Feldman’s postulation of completely shared evidence is unrealistic for the kinds of disputes he is considering, since different starting points will typically produce different assessments of what the evidence is and how it should be weighed. Feldman argues that there cannot be equally reasonable starting points, but his extension of the postulate of (...) completely shared evidence to evidence for starting points involves an illicit assimilation of ordinary cases of evidence assessment to cases in which substantial agreement about background assumptions is lacking. I also clarify why even if Feldman were correct about what epistemic norms require, his conclusion would not show that we should actually suspend judgment about religious or anti-religious truth claims. (shrink)

We are concerned with identifying by how much a finite cover of an 0-categorical structure differs from a sequence of free covers. The main results show that this is measured by automorphism groups which are nilpotent-by-abelian. In the language of covers, these results say that every finite cover can be decomposed naturally into linked, superlinked and free covers. The superlinked covers arise from covers over a different base, and to describe this properly we introduce the notion of a quasi-cover.These results (...) generalise results of the second author obtained in the case where the base of the cover is a grassmannian of a disintegrated set. They also give a complete proof of a statement of the second author extending this case to the case of a grassmannian of a modular set. To do this, we need to analyse the possible superlinked covers of such a set.We also give a combinatorial condition on the base of a cover which guarantees various chain conditions on finite covers over this base, and introduce a pregeometry which is useful in the analysis of finite covers with simple fibre groups. (shrink)